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EXCERPTS FROM STATEMENTS AND DECISIONS/RESOLUTIONS
BEFORE THE
REFERENDA HELD IN CYPRUS ON 24 APRIL 2004
BEFORE THE REFERENDA
UNSG Annan’s letter of 31 March 2004, addressed to the parties:
“Today, on the invitation of the parties in Cyprus in accordance with
the agreement of 13 February 2004, I have used my discretion to finalize
the text to be submitted to referenda on the basis of my plan, in order
to achieve a comprehensive settlement of the Cyprus Problem before 1 May
2004.”
In finalizing this document, I have been in close consultation with the
two parties in Cyprus, and with Greece and Turkey who have lent their
collaboration to the concentrated effort that has just been completed.
The outcome of these efforts is the fruit of negotiations under my
auspices in which each side represented itself, and no-one else, as the
political equal of the other.
The text finalized today represents the best chance ever for Cyprus to
be reunited.”
UNSG Annan’s speech delivered in Burgenstock on 31 March 2004:
“The revised plan has a property scheme that is simpler, fairer and more
certain. It has a more workable system of government. It has better
safeguards for the constituent states. It has transitional arrangements
that I am confident can and will work. And it has been improved from the
financial and economic point of view.
The process of negotiation is not a football match. It is not question
of keeping score, of goals and own goals, of winners and losers. Rather,
we have tried to accommodate the expressed concerns of both sides, so as
to create a win-win situation. I believe that we have succeeded.
This plan is inevitably a compromise. It does not satisfy everyone’s
demands. But I believe it meets the core interests, and addresses the
key concerns, of people on both sides.
Let us be clear. The choice is not between this settlement plan and some
other magical, mythical solution. In reality, the choice is between this
settlement and no settlement.
If the settlement is approved in the referenda next month, Cyprus would
reunify, in time to accede to the European Union. After only a short
interval, freedom of movement would prevail, without border-like
checkpoints. A new state of affairs would emerge, far better designed
than the one of 1960 to manage relations between the two communities. A
substantial number of Greek Cypriots would be able to return to the
homes they left behind thirty years ago, and to do so under Greek
Cypriot administration. Others would receive full and effective
compensation. Cypriots from both sides could return to their homes in
the area administered by the other Constituent State.
This plan is fair. It is designed to work. And I believe it provides
Cypriots with a secure framework for a common future. There have been
too many missed opportunities in the past. For the sake of all of you, I
urge you not to make the same mistake again.”
UNSG’s Special Advisor on Cyprus, Mr. de Soto’s briefing to the UN
Security Council on 2 April 2004:
“The parties committed themselves, in a first phase, to seek to agree on
changes and to complete the plan in all respects by 22 March 2004,
within the framework of the Secretary-General’s Mission of Good-Offices,
so as to produce a finalized text.
The parties further agreed that, in the absence of such agreement, the
Secretary-General would convene a meeting of the two sides --with the
participation of Greece and Turkey in order to lend their
collaboration-- in a concentrated effort to agree on a finalized text by
29 March.
As a final resort, in the event of a continuing and persistent deadlock,
the parties invited the Secretary-General to use his discretion to
finalize the text to be submitted to referenda on the basis of his plan.
The process agreed on 13 February was based on the conditions laid down
by the Secretary-General in this report to this Council on 1 April 2003
to resume his good offices effort. That approach received the support of
the Council in resolution 1475. And that process has now resulted in a
final text to go to referendum on 24 April 2004, the text presented by
the Secretary-General in Bürgenstock on 31 March 2004.
On 29 March, the Secretary-General presented a fully revised text for
consideration by the parties. In this revised text, the
Secretary-General sought to address the key concerns that had been
expressed by the two sides in the negotiations, while maintaining the
overall balance of the plan.
While not precluding the possibility that the parties might yet reach
agreement, the process, from this point onwards, moved to the third
phase of the effort envisaged in the 13 February agreement, in which the
text would be finalized by the Secretary-General. The Secretary-General
wished to do so in the closest collaboration with al concerned --hence
the consultations with the parties over the next 48 hours in the run-up
to the presentation of a final text on 31 March.
As is obvious, achieving a Cyprus settlement is a complex task-legally
and politically. But there are certain points that should not be lost
sight of.
First, the process has been conducted in full conformity with the
mandate provided to the Secretary-General by this Council. The product
of the work is a bi-communal, bi-zonal, federal system, a state of
Cyprus with a single international legal personality, sovereignty, and
citizenship. It it based on the principle of political equality between
Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots. Second, the plan is based on
respect for international law and individual human rights… Third, the
long-term objective of the plan is the demilitarization of Cyprus.
The plan is inevitably a compromise. It does not meet all the demands of
each side. But the Secretary-General believes it is a fair and balanced
plan.”
Statement attributable to the Spokesman for the Secretary-General on
Cyprus, 8 April 2004:
“The Secretary-General is disappointed to learn that Mr. Tassos
Papadopoulos has now called for rejection of the plan.”
Report of the UN Secretary-General to the UN Security Council, 16
April 2004:
“In resolution 1475 (2003) of 14 April 2003, the Security Council gave
its full support to my “carefully balanced plan” as a “unique basis for
further negotiations”, and called on all concerned to negotiate within
the framework of my good offices, using the plan to reach a
comprehensive as set forth in my report.
Following communications ad consultations that led me to believe that a
new effort might be warranted, on 4 February 2004, I wrote to Tassos
Papadopoulos, the Greek Cypriot leader, and Rauf Denktash, the Turkish
Cypriot leader, inviting them to New York on 10 February to resume
negotiations. In that letter I reiterated the terms in my report for a
resumption of negotiations and made a number of procedural suggestions
to facilitate negotiation and finalization. Both leaders accepted this
invitation.
As a final resort, in the event of a continuing and persistent deadlock,
the parties invited me to use my discretion to finalize the text to be
submitted to separate and simultaneous referenda on the basis of the
plan.
…due to differing views as to the appropriate format for direct
meetings, it did not prove possible to have face-to-face meetings. The
United Nations therefore sought, as it had in Cyprus in the week before
Bürgenstock, to build bridges though consultations with all parties, in
which it explored compromise suggestions and sought to ascertain the
priorities of the parties and where they might be prepared to show
flexibility to achieve them. Despite these effort, there was little give
and take. I joined the process on 28 March and submitted an overall
bridging proposal on 29 March. On that day, the Prime Ministers of
Greece and Turkey also joined the effort. Deadlock persisted, however,
on key issues, as became apparent during consultations in the subsequent
48 hours. At that juncture, there was no reason to believe that further
negotiations then or in the months to come would have produced a better
result or different outcome.
When he succeeded Glafcos Clerides as the Greek Cypriot leader, Mr.
Papadopoulos indicated that he would not reopen issues already agreed
upon.
The “Comprehensive Settlement of the Cyprus Problem”, which was drawn up
taking full consideration of relevant United Nations resolutions and
treaties, as stated in Security Council resolutions 1250 (1999) and 1475
(2003), provides for a new state of affairs that is in full accordance
with the Council’s vision of a settlement.”
These carefully balanced provisions are designed to address the worst
fears of each side described in my report to the Security Council of 1
April 2003 (S/2003/398, paras. 74-77).”
The plan is complex and delicately balanced. Inevitably, as in any
negotiation, it is a compromise.
Even though finalized by me at the invitation of the parties, the Plan’s
core concepts and key trade-offs, as well as the bulk of the many texts
included, are largely the work of Cypriots. The plan is the only
available and foreseeable route to the reunification of Cyprus.”
Statement by Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly President Peter
Schieder, 16 April 2004:
“A victory for the “Noes” in either part of Cyprus, or a postponement of
the referendum, will mean that only the Greek Cypriots join the EU on 1
May.
During the visit of Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly Rapporteur
Matyas Eörsi (Hungary, LDR) to Cyprus from 11 to 15 January, all major
Greek Cypriot political parties expressed their support for the Annan
Plan. They are now campaigning either against it or for postponement of
the referenda. This is extremely disappointing.
The Annan Plan is now the only opportunity the Cypriots have to see
their island reunited within the European Union, and the referenda on 24
April are the best moment for it.
A “No” vote, or postponement of the referenda, would only deepen and
perpetuate the division of Cyprus. This would also be a major blow to
the authority of the UN and a bad omen for its involvement in settling
international crises.
Those seeking to obstruct the settlement will bear grave political
responsibility for this failure and should not be allowed to take
advantage of it.
The international community and the European Union in particular, should
not betray the hopes of those Cypriots who are in favour of the
settlement, nor make them pay the price of failure.”
European Parliament resolution on Cyprus 21 April 2004:
“The European Parliament,
Points out that the final settlement plan has been negotiated between
the two sides on the island of Cyprus with the involvement of Greece and
Turkey and has been finalized under the authority of the UN Security
Council by the UNSG Kofi Annan;
Expresses its support, and welcomes the initiative of the United Nations
Secretary General, who on 31 March handed over to the two parties the
final version of his plan on the reunification of Cyprus, which will be
put to two separate referenda on the island on 24 April, as agreed by
all parties in New York on 13 February 2004, so that the reunited island
can join the European Union on 1 May.
Shares the Commission’s view that it is not a question of making a
choice between the Annan Plan and another plan, but of choosing between
this plan and no alternative for a long period of time;
Calls on the citizens of Cyprus to be fully responsible, consistent and
committed to their status as EU citizens, and to seize this historic
opportunity to reunify their country in a peaceful way.”
Secretary-General’s video message, 21 April 2004:
“Parts of the plan were put together by the United Nations. But all of
its key concepts emerged out of four years of negotiation among your
leaders. And most of its 9,000 pages were drafted by hundreds of Greek
Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots. Their extraordinary efforts produced one
of the most comprehensive peace plans in the history of the United
Nations.
..it is a compromise, as is inevitable in any negotiation. It is also
the only foreseeable route to the reunification of Cyprus. There is no
other plan out there. There is no magic way of accommodating the maximum
demands of one side while at the same time accommodating the maximum
demands of the other. This is it.
…The plan envisages one independent and sovereign state, the United
Cyprus Republic. That State is based on the parameters agreed between
the parties since the 1970s --a bi-communal, bi-zonal federal structure,
based on the political equality of the two communities. The plan
prohibits partition or secession, domination by one side, or union with
any other country. The plan ends the status quo. It ends the division of
the country. It would allow a reunited Cyprus to speak with one voice
internationally, particularly in the European Union. The plan fully
respects individual human rights including the rights of those of you
who were forced to leave your homes.
We have worked closely with the European Union, the World Bank and the
IMF to make a number of changes, to ensure that the plan is economically
and financially sound.
We are determined that neither the events of 1963, nor those of 1974,
will ever be repeated.
The vision of the plan is simple: reunification and reconciliation, in
safety and security, in the European Union.”
EU
Enlargement Commissioner Verheugen’s statement to the European
Parliament, 21 April 2004:
“…Tassos Papadopoulos’ Government of the Republic of Cyprus has
surprised everybody by pursuing a rejectionist strategy, I believe for
two reasons that this is extremely regrettable:
First; in 1999, at the request of the Greek Cypriot Government, we had
said that the resolution of the Cypriot conflict was not a prerequisite
for Cyprus’ accession to the EU. We did this on the understanding that
the Greek Cypriot leadership would do nothing to bring down a proposed
agreement and that they would do all that was possible to bring about a
solution. I call on Mr. Papadopoulos to live up to his commitments.
Second; the Government of the Republic of Cyprus repeatedly asserted
that it was in agreement with the general lines of the Annan Plan. They
said that they were willing to act within the lines of the Plan. In
Switzerlad, they suddenly rejected that notion. The Government of the
Republic of Cyprus now proposes the rejection of the international
settlement. I am going to be undiplomatic, I feel cheated by the Greek
Cypriot government. For months on end, I have done everything I could in
good faith to make it possible for Greek Cypriots to accept this plan.
This is a country that will be joining the EU soon. The least we could
expect is a fair and balanced information campaign. Never before in the
history of the Commission has a member of the European Commission been
accused of interference in the internal affairs of a Member State. I
call on Papadopoulos to guarantee the freedom of the media.
I regret that the many Greek Cypriot statements have lacked the words,
peace, understanding and co-existence. All these terms have been absent.
There would never be a solution which satisfies either side 100 %. No
better plan can ever be made.”
Open letter from Walter Schwimmer, Secretary General of the Council
of Europe 21 April 2004:
“The Annan Plan offers all Cypriots --for the first time-- a concrete,
balanced and comprehensive proposal for the settlement of the Cyprus
issue. It received the support of the whole international community at
the Donors’ Conference in Brussels on 15 April.
The Plan, which will be put to…referendum this coming Saturday, has been
prepared over years throughout the patient efforts of the UN and both
Cypriot communities.
A rejection of the proposed plan of the Secretary General of the United
Nations would deepen the division between the two Communities.
Confidence that has been rebuilt --with much difficulty-- over the last
decades will be lost, and will be hard to regain.
Furthermore, Europe and the wider international community would not
understand the waste of this unique chance. Their good will to support
further attempts to find a solution will not return for a number of
years”
Statement of White House Spokesman Mr. Mcclellan, 21 April 2004:
“The Annan plan offers a hopeful vision of a peaceful and prosperous
future for all Cypriots as citizens of a unified state in the form of a
bi-zonal, bi-communal federation that honors the traditions of its
diverse citizens while forging a common future with the European Union.
The settlement that the secretary-general finalized on March 31st
outlined an equitable compromise in which no party receives everything
it seeks, but which satisfies the fundamental requirements of all
parties.”
UNSG Annan’s statement on arrival at UN Headquarters, 21 April 2004:
“I hope that the people of Cyprus realize that on such a day they have
an historic decision before them, a decision that will allow a reunited
Cyprus to find its place in Europe...
If they say ‘no’ then the Greek Cypriot part of Cyprus enters the EU
with the Turkish part remaining outside and the plan will be dead and my
role will have ended”
Statement by the President of the European Council Mr. Bertie Ahern,
24 April 2004:
“Through their patient and determined efforts, in cooperation with the
parties, the Secretary General and his team have created a unique and
historic opportunity for a settlement of the Cyprus problem. In his
report to the UN Security Council which was released yesterday, Kofi
Annan stated clearly that the plan is the only available and foreseeable
route to the reunification of Cyprus.
Let me just say that, as President of the European Council over the past
few months, I have had discussion on Cyprus with political leaders
across Europe. I think it is only right to say that the view of the
overwhelming majority is that the proposed settlement would be good for
both communities in Cyprus and good for the European Union.”
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