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Highlights of the UNSG´s report
UN SECRETARY-GENERAL’S REPORT (S/2004/437)
ON HIS GOOD-OFFICES MISSION IN CYPRUS, DATED 28 MAY 2004
SOME HIGHLIGHTS
1. On the Situation of the Turkish Cypriots and the Need to End Their
Isolation:
“In the aftermath of the vote (referenda), the situation of the
Turkish Cypriots calls for the attention of the international community
as a whole, including the Security Council.” (para. 89)
“Turkish Cypriot vote has undone any rationale for pressuring and
isolating them.” (Summary and para. 90)
“I would hope that the members of the (Security) Council can give a
strong lead to all States to cooperate both bilaterally and in
international bodies to eliminate unnecessary restrictions and barriers
that have the effect of isolating the Turkish Cypriots and impeding
their development, deeming such a move as consistent with security
Council resolutions 541(1983) and 550(1984).” (Summary and para. 93)
2. On the Solution and the Questions on the Greek Cypriot Attitude:
“My Plan has now run aground on the decision of the Greek Cypriot
electorate” (para. 73)
“The rejection of such a plan by the Greek Cypriot electorate is a
major setback.” (para. 83)
“This is the first time that the Greek Cypriot public has been asked
to vote on a bicommunal, bi-zonal federal solution of the Cyprus
problem.” “However, the sheer size of the “No” vote raises even more
fundamental questions.” (para. 85)
“Most of the dispossessed in the south, by hard work and enterprise,
have carved out a prosperous livelihood. “ “While they strongly state
their wish to reunify, many see in a settlement very little gain, and
quite a lot of inconvenience and risk. “ (para. 85)
“What was rejected was the solution itself rather than a mere
blueprint.” (para. 83)
“…a solution means not just two constituent states, but also political
equality and the sharing of power.” (para. 85)
“If the Greek Cypriots are ready to share power and prosperity with
the Turkish Cypriots in a federal structure based on political equality,
this needs to be demonstrated, not just by word, but by action.” (para.
86)
“If they (Greek Cypriots) remain willing to resolve the Cyprus problem
through a bi-communal, bi-zonal federation, this needs to be
demonstrated.” (Summary)
“Meanwhile, in the aftermath of the watershed vote of 24 April, I
believe that a fundamental reassessment of the full range of United
Nations peace activities in Cyprus is timely. That reassessment should
include the four-decade old search for peace in Cyprus, and consider how
best to address the problem in the future.” (para. 92)
3. On the Greek Cypriot Behavior at the Negotiation Table:
“The Greek Cypriot side, took each issue in turn, and produced dense
and lengthy papers, one after another…” “..:it became apparent that the
10 February paper summary of Greek Cypriot demands was far from
exhaustive…” “The Greek Cypriot side declined to provide a comprehensive
paper of all the textual amendments it sought until mid-way through
Phase 2 (in Burgenstock, Switzerland), and declined to prioritize its
demands, despite my Special Adviser’s request of 15 March to both sides
to do so.” (para. 20)
“The Greek Cypriot side regularly insisted on full satisfaction of its
demands.” (para. 22)
“The Turkish Cypriot side was relatively open in such consultations,
the Greek Cypriot side less so.” “An additional difficulty was that
accounts of bilateral meetings between my Special Adviser and the Greek
Cypriot leader, at least when teams were present, often turned up in the
press presented in a negative light.” (para. 24)
“The Greek Cypriot side was critical of the framework suggested while
the Turkish Cypriot side responded more positively.” (para. 26)
“…the Greek Cypriot side indicated that it did not wish to meet in
this format.” (para. 33)
“With the first days taken up with procedure, and no meetings with the
Greek Cypriot leader on the following three days, full use was not made
of four of the six days available for this critical negotiation.” (para.
35)
“The Greek Cypriot side did not produce a consolidated list of demands
until 25 March 2004--which ran to 44 pages. At no stage was there any
indication of priorities among these demands.” (para. 37)
“The Greek Cypriots did not discuss their own territorial ideas, even
informally, with the United Nations” “Eventually, the Greek Cypriot side
departed from this position on 30 March 2004…… but proposed as a
trade-off something that had already been included as part of my
bridging proposal.” (para. 59)
“Mr.Papadopoulos, in a broadcast speech on 7 April 2004, called upon
the people to reject the plan with a “resounding No”. Among other
things, the speech challenged the wisdom of “doing away with our
internationally recognized state exactly at the very moment it
strengthens its political weight, with its accession to the European
Union”. I was surprised at this assessment, in the light of what
Mr.Papadopulos had said to me in Brussels in January, I was also
surprised at his interpretation of the plan, since the plan is designed
to allow each side to maintain its position on how the new state of
affairs would come into being.” (para. 65)
“Likewise, given what he had said to me in The Hague in March 2003, I
was concerned that the Greek Cypriot leader’s speech appeared to call
into question many fundamental aspects of the plan, even while
acknowledging that the final version contained improvements. I do not
believe the speech accurately reflected the contents of the plan on a
range of issues.” (para. 66)
4. On the Greek Cypriot Claims :
“On 13 February 2004, the parties in Cyprus committed to negotiating
in good faith on the basis of the settlement plan dated 26 February
2003.” “To this end, they agreed to a three-phase negotiation and
finalization procedure.” “In Phase 3 of the effort, after consultations
with the parties, I finalized on 31 March 2004 the text to be submitted
to referenda on the basis of the plan, maintaining its overall balance
while addressing to the extent possible the key concerns of each side.”
(Summary)
“Procedures were fully consistent with the position taken by the Greek
Cypriot leader, Tassos Papadopoulos, at The Hague.” (para. 4)
“He (the Greek Cypriot leader) reassured me that he did not seek
“forty or fifty” changes to the plan, and that all the changes he would
seek would be within the parameters of the plan.” (para. 8)
“….the Turkish Cypriot side was generally prepared to engage on Greek
Cypriot proposals and to discuss matters on a realistic basis, and
sought to make counter-offers and compromise proposals” (para. 21)
“I was also determined to ensure that, if the burden fell to me to
finalize the text by 31 March 2004, I should do so in close consultation
with all concerned.” (para. 30)
“Only after all opportunities for dialogue had been exhausted, and
every effort made to sound the parties out on possible changes, did I
make a series of bridging proposals…” (para. 38)
“The changes made in the finalization process were designed to address
to the extent possible the key outstanding concerns conveyed by the
leaders to the United Nations…” (para. 43)
“For the Greek Cypriot side, the plan was significantly improved to
address its concerns…” (para. 44)
“Another area of concern for the Greek Cypriot side related to the
rights of displaced and dispossessed persons – a subject on which
Mr.Papadopoulos did not initially propose changes.” (para. 48)
“The Greek Cypriots did not discuss their own territorial ideas, even
informally, with the United Nations” Eventually, the Greek Cypriot side
departed from this position on 30 March 2004, when it expressed for the
first time interest in specific pieces of territory, but proposed as a
trade-off something that had already been included as part of my
bridging proposal.” (para. 59)
“The provisions of the plan related to the Treaty of Guarantee did not
change. The Greek Cypriot side did not propose any changes to the Treaty
when discussing security issues in Cyprus…” (para. 61)
“Nor do I accept the argument in the speech, repeated thereafter, that
when the plan was finalized, Turkey’s concerns were satisfied and Greek
Cypriot concerns largely ignored… It might have been possible to
accommodate other Greek Cypriot concerns had the Greek Cypriot side been
more willing to engage in give and take at Burgenstock and before, and
to prioritize its objectives.” (para. 66)
“…the Greek Cypriot leader did not wish the Council to take decisions
–even on security issues – before the referendum.” (para. 69)
“The plan was a clear improvement, for both sides. It conforms to the
Council’s long-held vision of a settlement. It was deemed a workable
plan by the European Commission. It was deemed functional and
financially sound, not only by the European Commission but also by the
international Monetary Fund.”
5. Acknowledgement and Appreciation of the Positions Taken by Turkey and
the Turkish Cypriot side:
“The change of policy engineered by the Turkish Government which
enabled this new effort to take off reflects well on the political
maturity of that country and her leaders. By the commitments made to me
by Prime Minister Erdoðan on 24 January 2004 when we met at Davos, and
by Turkey’s determination throughout the February meetings in New York,
the talks process in Cyprus, and the culmination in Bürgenstock, the
effort to reach a settlement received an immeasurable boost. “ “I
appreciated the strong support of the Turkish government, from the top
down, for my efforts.” (para. 78)
“Mess. Erdoðan, Gül and Talat also sought to convey to the Greek
Cypriot public, by statements and interviews, and, in the case of
Mr.Talat, by visiting the south, the determination of the Turkish
Cypriots and Turkey to abide by their commitments under the plan and
fully implement a settlement.” (para. 64)
“Mr.Denktash on 11 February proposed a three-stage procedure which he
informed me had the support of Turkey and which conformed broadly with
the parameters I had proposed. “ (para. 12)
“I wish to record …my appreciation of the efforts of Mr.Talat both in
the process and in the run-up to the referendum.” (para. 76)
“…the Turkish Cypriot side was generally prepared to engage on Greek
Cypriot proposals and to discuss matters on a realistic basis, and
sought to make counter-offers and compromise proposals.” (para. 21)
“The Turkish Cypriot side was relatively open in such consultations,
the Greek Cypriot side less” (para. 24)
“The Greek Cypriot side was critical of the framework suggested while
the Turkish Cypriot side responded more positively.” (para. 26)
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