Time for rethinking on Cyprus

Sunday, April 24, 2005

Those who talk about ‘reunification’ seem to imagine that a settlement could transform the island of Cyprus at a stroke into something like Belgium or Wales. The truth is that there would always be the risk of ‘Lebanonization’

ÖZDEM SANBERK*

  The central question that underlies the future of Cyprus is the road that mainland Greece will take. It has a fateful choice before it. If it merely endorses the Greek Cypriot government of Tassos Papadopoulos, this will mean that it has, in effect, surrendered decision-making powers to him. And there can be no doubt that this will not lead to a resolution of the problems of the eastern Mediterranean and could lead to much graver problems.

  But I am hopeful that this will not be the case. Of course Greece has to take into account what it perceives to be the real interests of the Greek Cypriots, just as Turkey always bears in mind the welfare and security of the Turkish Cypriots. But that no longer necessarily means espousing confrontation. It means recognizing the facts and recognizing that they are not necessarily unbearable if peace springs from doing so.

  

A brave proposal from Greece:

  There have been signs for some time that a deeper realism and spirit of conciliation has come into being among some of the leading foreign policy thinkers of Greece. There have been some striking examples of this, though to date they have not attracted much attention outside Greece and they are largely unknown in Turkey.

  In 1995, four senior Greek diplomats (Evstathios Lagakos, Georgios Papulyas, Yoannis Cunis and Viron Theodoropulos), all retired ambassadors, published a book on Greek foreign policy: “Considerations and Concerns On Greek Foreign Policy.” Their book is on sale in Greece but does not exist in translation. This is a pity, for what they have to say on Cyprus as chapter five of their book is of very great interest.

  Let me quote them in translation.

  They write: “It has become obvious that the processes and efforts pursued for the Cyprus question have not yet come to a satisfactory conclusion. As time elapsed, the Turkish Cypriots have institutionalized the pseudo state and gradually increased their demands.”

  That, of course, is a familiar Greek position. But then they proceed to a much more radical conclusion than has been widely heard to date.

  “This imposes upon us the need to re-examine the whole matter right from the beginning. Until now, our demand has been for a single and undivided Cyprus. The course of events, however, indicates that we are moving towards either a confederation -- be it loose or not -- which the Greek Cypriot side rejects, or the consolidation and perpetuation of the current status quo which results from the faits accomplis created by the Turkish side. It is therefore compelling to consider the option of two separate states that would secure for us those advantages -- or tradeoffs -- which we will deem necessary.

  “We all understand how difficult, both emotionally and politically, it is for the Cypriots in particular and for Hellenism in general to accept such an idea. In the final analysis, it will be up to the Greek Cypriot side to make the final decision. Yet, discussion of this idea in a proper and responsible manner will not cause any harm. At any rate, there are at least two aspects of such a formula that cannot be neglected. These are:

  "Firstly, an independent Cyprus Republic that will consist purely for the Greek Cypriot population, will not be subject to the difficulties created by the Turkish Cypriot element, either in the form of unavoidable vice presidential or parliamentary vetoes, or in the form of co-administrative and joint decision mechanisms in major foreign, defense and economic matters. Neither will the affluent economy of south Cyprus be compelled to transfer funds to the poor economy of north Cyprus with a view to establishing an economic equilibrium.

  "A solution based on separation will also mean that there will be an international boundary line between the Turkish-controlled north Cyprus and Greek Cyprus and not a simple 'Green Line.' It would be politically difficult and dangerous to violate an internationally recognized boundary line without the right of guarantorship or the emergence of a casus belli. Whereas in a federation, or even a confederation, it would be much easier for a third party guarantor to find pretexts for an intervention by arguing that the responsibilities of the central authority, which are confined by vague legal/constitutional limitations, have been violated.”

  So instead the ambassadors advocate the idea of “negotiating on the basis for two separate states.”

  

Risk of Lebanonization:

  These are brave words. I salute them not only for their political courageousness but also for their vision and intelligence. And above all for the fact that they contain the basic principle that Turks and Turkish Cypriots have always asked for: recognition that there are two separate and equal but distinct nationalities in Cyprus. This approach is utterly unlike that of those who saw Cyprus as a Hellenic island in which there might be a non-Hellenic minority but one which was inherently alien, minor and unequal. On this basis, surely we can work as partners, with confidence, to construct a durable settlement that will not prove to be a short-lived "house of cards."

  There is realism, too, about the requirement for security on both sides. I know that those who talk about "reunification" seem to imagine that a settlement could transform the island of Cyprus at a stroke into something like Belgium or Wales. The truth is that there would always be the risk of “Lebanonization.” Lebanon was an example of a very successful inter-communal settlement in its day, designed by the Ottoman Tanzimat leaders Fuat Pasha and A'ali Pasha. But time and change upset the balances, particularly the demographic ones, and it broke down in a tragic and to date irremediable fashion. We would hope to spare a post-settlement Cyprus that fate. The former Greek ambassadors in their book, in the next paragraph after the ones I have quoted, point out the difficulties of Lebanon and the need for more radical arrangements. They are, however, less radical in that they would be directly based on the broad status quo in the island today, with geographical separation and Turkish and Greek Cypriot states.

  

Practical limitations:

  They point out the great difficulty that would, in fact, come up in practice in integration of such matters as economics and defense. They recognize that the time for such integration may have passed already. “No doubt such negotiations could have been more productive had they been held a few years earlier.”

  The fact of the matter is that the two nationalities in Cyprus have each now enjoyed more than a generation of separate self-government. That is the result of the "long struggle" policy and the exclusion of the Turkish Cypriots from the rest of the island through siege tactics.

  Those who, like Papadopoulos, want to struggle on for a forcible reunification based effectively on the abolition of genuine Turkish Cypriot self-government and the re-imposition of Greek Cypriot rule over the entire island are deluding themselves. The Annan plan recognized the practical limitations that have to be realized. The leaders of the Greek Cypriots did not. They chose deadlock and a cul de sac.

  They ignored the practical considerations involved, including those that I have given above, identified by the Greek ambassadors.

  President Denktaş achieved many things for the Turkish Cypriot people during the 32 years he was their leader. It is thanks to him that they today enjoy a secure form of self-government. His name will be remembered with respect and honor.

  Now his successor, Mehmet Ali Talat, is in a position to negotiate a settlement. It will not be exactly what might have been achieved in April 2004 if the Greek Cypriots had not rejected the Annan plan. That moment has passed. It will certainly not be what the "hawks" of southern Cyprus are hoping and pressing for. Their demands are unacceptable both at the Cypriot level and the international and European Union level. There is no possibility of the Annan plan being revised or scaled down along the lines they want. That would be a flagrant injustice, which the international community would not accept. Since it would not lead to a settlement, it would simply consolidate the division of the island.

  This would pose huge difficulties for the European Union. It relaxed its normal entry criteria to allow the Greek Cypriots to join. In particular it ruled that a candidate where over a third of its claimed population rejects the legal authority of the applicant government had political stability and satisfied the Copenhagen criteria. It now has to confront the reality of political and national division on Cyprus. Working with Talat and hopefully some day with Papadopoulos, the consequences of this mistake can be overcome. But nothing would be gained from following Papadopoulos into his chosen cul de sac of endless confrontation.

  So what I think we must all face is that while the deadlock exists, we shall see a gradualist scenario unfolding. It will involve the promised relaxation of the conditions of the Turkish Cypriots, an ending of the siege and the creation of a modus vivendi.

  This may seem alarming to some on the Greek side, but I believe it should not do so. To those who want to reflect on this matter, I would commend the thoughts of the Greek ambassadors that I have quoted. With realism and courage, they have seen the route that must now be taken in efforts to find a settlement in Cyprus.

  * Retired ambassador, former undersecretary of the Turkish Foreign Ministry.